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NOTE
THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE ACT OF JUNE 1ST, 1945
An assignm'ent of goods to secure a debt, the possession of the goods re-
maining in the debtor, is a chattel mortgage, passing the title to the property
assigned, as between the parties, and, if the conditions of the assignment are
broken, the assignee may recover the goods.' But a chattel mortgage, while valid
as between the parties or as against purchasers with notice, has always been held
to be of no effect as against creditors of the mortgagor, without change of pos-
session of the chattel.2
A chattel mortgage, executed in a statz where such a mortgage is valid, has
never been enforced in Pennsylvania against chattels removed to Pennsylvania
and purchased by an innocent third party.'
It has always been the settled rule in Pennsylvania that chattel mortgages
are contrary to public policy and will not prevail against claims of bona fide
purchasers or creditors. 4 A valid pledge of personal property as against creditors
of the pledgor involves delivery of possession of the pledged property to the
pledgee. 5
The reason chattel mortgages have always been regarded as "inimical to the
public policy of the state and void as to execution creditors" was because our
recording acts did not 'extend to writings concerning personal property and the
attempted lien was a secret one.6
Likewise a sale of a chattel without delivery of possession is invalid as
against a subsequent innocent purchaser who gets possession. He who first
obtains possession is entitled to the property.7 So also, unless there be a change
'Boyle v. Rankin, 22 Pa. 168 (1853).
2Clow v. Woods, 5 S. & R. 275 (1819); Welsh v. Bekey, 1 P. & W. 57.
3State Bank of Sherman v. Carr, 15 Super. Ct. 346 (1800); Commercial Banking Corp. v.
Berkowitz, 104 Super. Ct. 523, 159 A. 214 (1932); Kaufman & Baer v. Monrofe Motor Line, 124
Super. Ct. 27 (1936).
4Klaus v. Majestic Apartment House Co., 250 Pa. 194, 95 A. 451 (1915).
6Roberts' & Pyne's App., 60 Pa. 400, (1869).
6Klaus v. Majestic Apt. House Co., supra, n. 4, at page 220; Young, to use, etc., et al. v.
Kipe et al., 38 D. & C. 434 (1940).
7McKee v. Ward, 289 Pa. 414 (1927) ; Sec. 25 of The Sales Act, 69 P. S. 203.
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of possession or adequate action indicating a change of ownership, a sale is
deemed fraudulent and void as against the seller's attaching or levying creditors.8
For the same reason, all attempts to retain ownership until a buyer has paid the
price have been ineffective as against such third parties unless the conditional
sale contract has been recorded.' On the other hand, bailors have been protected,
though the bailee is given an option to buy and though the "price" is out of all
proportion to the "rental" payments.10
While a bailment allowing use by the bailee has had the approval of our
courts, though accompanied by a contract to sell, if the bailee complied with all
the terms of the bailment contract and paid the agreed price, a bailor was not
permitted to authorize the bailee to sell the goods and, if he does so, and fails
to account for the proceeds, then recover the goods from the purchaser."
The financing of dealers has been accomplished by means of the trust
receipt, the history of which in Pennsylvania is covered in a comment on the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act in 46 D. L. Rev. 109 to 120. Tht goods were uni-
formly held not subject to levy by creditors of the dealer, though the bailment
was for the very purpose of sale.12 Even a sale, to be good against the bailor,
must be one "in the ordinary course of business."13 Section 9 of the Conditional
Sales of 1925 contains a like limitation.14
In the trust receipt situation title passes from the manufacturer direct to the
banker, while in a chattel mortgage title passes from the borrower to the lender.
Accordingly, if title has vested in the borrower, there was no room for the use
of a trust receipt prior to the enactment of the Trust Receipts Act. 5 The second
section of this act provides that the interest of the entruster may be derived from
the trustee.' " Thus in a limited field a chattel mortgage was authorized by
that act.
The multiplication of federal lending agencies and the theory that borrow-
ing is the short cut to prosperity seem to account for the succession of chattel
mortgage statutes enacted in Pennsylvania in the last few years. 17 Competition
of state institutions with federal agencies has no doubt forced the legislature to
follow Washington's conception of public policy and make this new contribu-
tion to inflation.
8
Callaghan v. Union Trust Co. of Pittsburgh, 315 Pa. 274, 172 A. 684 (1934).
9
Holland Furnace Co. v. Suzik, 118 Super. Ct. 405 (1935).
10General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hartman, 114 Super. Ct. 544, 174 A. 795 (1934).
l'Hoeveler-Stutz Co. v. Cleveland Motor Sales, 92 Super. Ct. 425, (1928).
12 Brown Bros. & Co. v. Billington, 163 Pa. 76, (1894).
13Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Baum & Sons, 187 Pa. 48 (1898); General Credit Corp. v.
Penn Securities Co., 25 D. & C. 119 (1935).
1469 P. S. sec. 406, Atlas Auto Finance Corp. v. Greenberg, 39 D. & C. 539.
16Sterling Commercial Co. v. Smith, 291 Pa. 236, 139 A. 847 (1927).
16Act of July 10, 1941, P. L. 307, 68 P. S. sec. 552.
1
7
Act of March 2, 1933, P. L. 6, Supplied by Act of May 21, 1943, P. L. 343, 21 P. S.
936.1-936.16, limited to live stock and farm machinery; Act of July 15, 1936, P. L. 47, 21
P. S. 841, to secure loans by federal government or one of its instrumentalities.
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The Act of June 1st, 1945, is all inclusive as to the mortgageable property
and it will add tremendously to purchasing power at a time when demand
already far exceeds the supply of consumer goods.
The subject of the mortgage may include all crops, whether annual or per-
ennial, which the mortgagor proposes to plant at any time within one year after
the date of the mortgage. Presumably the mortgagor should at least be the
tenant of the land on which it is proposed to plant a crop. The mortgage may
include all after-acquired property, so long as it is of the same class as that
described in the mortgage.
The act defines the operation and effect of the lien of chattel mortgages,
provides for the filing, indexing, and docketing of them in the prothonotaries'
offices, fixes the fees of prothonotaries, provides for the filing in Pennsylvania
of such other instruments originally filed or recorded in other states, regulates the
assignment, release, satisfaction and extension of the lien of chattel mortgages,
prescribes the method of foreclosure, defines defaults and violations of the terms
of the mortgages, makes it a misdemeanor for a mortgagor to "wilfully sell"
any mortgaged property before payment of the debt and also provides penalties,
if the owner of the property "shall wilfully injure, destroy, conceal or without
notice to the mortgagee, abandon, or wilfully deface any marks identifying the
mortgaged property."
The Act of May 21st, 1943, P. L. 343, is repealed but the Act of 1945
provides that it shall not be construed to repeal or affect any other act relating
to chattel mortgages.
The provisions of the new act follow closely the provisions of the act of
1943 but there are some changes which should be noted. Instead of limiting the
interest rate to six per cent, it is now provided that the mortgage shall not bear
interest in excess of the rate which the creditor is permitted by law to charge
at the time of the execution of the mortgage.
The Act of 1943 did not require that the mortgage be acknowledged or
witnessed. Now the mortgage must be "signed, witnessed and duly acknow-
ledged by the mortgagor or his agent duly authorized and constituted." Whether
such agent is to be deemed duly authorized, when his only authority is verbal,
will have to await a decision by the courts. It may be that the courts will apply
the same rule that has been applied when the memorandum made to satisfy the
4th section of the Sales Act is executed by an agent, in which case it is held
that the agent's authority need not be in writing.1s
The mortgage may secure a pre-existing debt and any future advancements,
whether the same are obligatory or optional, but such advancements must be
18McGowan v. Lustig-Burgerhoff Co., 93 Super. Ct. 227; Penn Discount Corp. v. Sharp, 125
Super. Ct. 171.
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made within a period of five years from the date of the mortgage and, of course,
must not exceed the amount stated in the mortgage. Expenditures by the mort-
gagee for taxes, insurance, repairs and maintenance of the mortgaged property
are secured by the mortgage, together with interest on all such advancements.
If the subject of the mortgage is a motor vehicle the filing of the mortgage
shall not operate as notice of the lien to creditors and purchasers until a state-
ment of the lien is noted on the certificate of title.
If the subject of the mortgage is attached to realty or involves crops, the
lien of the mortgage will be superior to all liens upon the realty but any real
estate mortgage will have a lien prior to a chattel mortgage placed subsequently on
any chattels attached to the realty or crops growing thereon. A judicial sale on a
lien subsequent to the lien of the chattel mortgage does not divest the lien of
the chattel mortgage and the purchaser at the judicial sale takes subject to the
lien of the chattel mortgage.
If mortgaged chattels are removed from the county in which the mortgaged
property was at the time of the execution of the mortgage or from the county
in which the mortgage is filed, without the written consent of the mortgagee,
the property remains subject to the lien of the mortgage.
This provision would appear to operate to make it necessary for the pur-
chaser of a chattel to make a search in the office of every prothonotary in the
Commonwealth, and as noted in a comment upon the Act of July 24th, 1941, P.
L. 439, in 46 Dickinson Law Review 97, this section would appear to create
an intolerable burden of record searching. One must now be sure that any
chattel he buys has a all times been located in the county in which it now is.
The place of filing of a chattel mortgage is the county in which the
chattels are at the time of filing. The mortgage may cover chattels located in
several counties, in which case the mortgage is to be filed in all of such counties.
The original mortgage is filed in one county and a certified copy may be filed in
the other counties.
When the property is removed to another county with the written consent
of the mortgagee, it remains subject to the lien of the mortgage for a period of
six months from the day of removal but not longer, unless within such period a
copy of the mortgage is filed in the county to which the property has been re-
moved. Under the act of June 12th, 1931, P. L. 558, 21 P. S. sec. 351, no
interest in real estate acquired under a contract can be asserted against a sub-
sequent bona fide purchaser, mortgagee or the holder of any judgment entered
in the county in which the land is situate, unless the written contract has been
recorded before the recording of the subsequent deed, mortgage or judgment.
This seems to be the sensible rule and to permit a delay of six months in the
filing of the mortgage in the county to which the mortgagee consents that the
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property may be removed makes transactions involving personal property ex-
tremely hazardous. Such transactions hereafter will have to be confined to deal-
ings with persons who are unquestionably responsible financially, so that re-
course may be had on the implied warranty of title, provided for in the 13th
section of the Act of May 19th, 1915 P. L. 543, 69 P. S. sec. 122, subsec. Third.
The holder of a chattel mortgage may assert his lien against the proceeds of
any sale of mortgaged property, whether or not it was made with his consent,
but the act makes no provision as to how this lien is to be enforced, either before
or after the purchaser of the property has paid the price.
In East Central Fruit Growers Production Credit Assn. v. Zuritsky, 346
Pa. 335 (1943) it was held that under the act of 1933 and its amendments, all of
which were repealed by the act of 1943, if the holder of a chattel mortgage
consents to a sale of the mortgaged property by the mortgagor, this constitutes
a waiver by the mortgagee of his lien both on the mortgaged goods and the
proceeds thereof. Now, both under the act of 1943 and the act of 1945, the lien
on the goods may be waived without waiving the lien on the proceeds. (See sec.
6 of Act of 1943 and sec. 6 (a) of Act of 1945).
Presumably the mortgagee may compel a second payment of the price to
him, if a buyer or the selling agent pays the proceeds to the mortgagor and he
fails to satisfy the mortgage out of the proceeds.
There is deemed to be a default by the mortgagor whenever he removes
the mortgaged property from the county without the consent of the mortgagee
or whenever he shall substantially injure it or conceal it or purport to dispose
any part of it or shall "by his wilfull act or neglect substantially impair the
value" of the mortgaged property. It may even be stipulated in the mortgage
that injury to or destruction of the chattel, though without the fault of the
mortgagor, shall constitute a default and, of course, such destruction does not
discharge the mortgagor from any part of his debt.
The act should be consulted for details in regard to filing, indexing and
the fees the Prothonotary is entitled to charge in this connection, also as to the
approved method of assignment of chattel mortgages and the satisfaction thereof.
Upon any default, the mortgagee may, without process of law, imme-
diately take possession of the mortgaged property and any expense incurred in
the preservation of the property is recoverable as part of the mortgage debt.
The mortgagee may then sell at public or private sale, after giving ten days
written notice to the mortgagor by letter mailed to his last known address.
Prior to the sale a right of redemption is given and any surplus realized as a
result of the sale is payable to the mortgagor.
The act further provides that the mortgage may be foreclosed by any of
the methods authorized by law for the foreclosure of a mortgage. This clause
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evidently refers to the existing methods of foreclosing a real estate mortgage,
though some of them obviously would not be applicable to a chattel mortgage.19
Judgment may be entered on the warrant contained in the bond or note
secured by the mortgage and the lien of a levy upon the mortgaged property,
acquired by an execution on such judgment, relates back to the date of the
filing of the mortgage. The goods are sold in the same manner in which per-
sonal property is regularly sold under an execution. This of course is an applica-
tion of the well settled rule in the case of real estate mortgages.
20
In United States v. Kemmerer, 43 D. & C. 197 (1941) Judge Henninger
said:
"Since the case of Clow et al v. Woods, 5 S. & R. 275, it has
been settled law in Pennsylvania that a sale of personal property-
and "sale" included "pledge''-without change of possession
is void as to creditors and bona fide purchasers: Callahan v. Union
Trust company of Pittsburgh, 315 Pa. 274, 278; Shipler et al. v.
New Castle Paper Products Corp., 293 Pa. 412, 421; Wendel v.
Smith et al., 291 Pa. 247, 249. The rule is for the benefit of ex-
isting creditors, as well as others who may have lent credit later
relying upon debtor's apparent affluence: Buckley v. Duff & Sons,
114 Pa. 596, 603; Hemphill Co. v. Davis Knitting Co. et al., 114
Pa. Superior Ct. 94, 99.
Most of these cases have been decided upon the basis of a
public policy to avoid the dangers of fraud and to avoid a break-
down in our credit system. It is conceded, however, that, regard-
less of the policy established by the courts, it is within the power
of the legislature to change the policy. So, in. Personal Finance
Company of New York v. General Finance Co., 133 Pa. Superior
Ct. 582, 587, it is pointed out that the hostility to chattel mortgages
has been somewhat modified."
It will now have to be stated that the hostility to chattel mortgages, as ex-
hibited by our judicial decisions, has been entirely nullified by the Act of 1945.
It has always been held that household goods and furniture upon leased
premises are subject to distress whether held under a bailment, a lease or a
conditional sale.
21
Whether this principle will be applied to chattels covered by a filed chattel
mortgage remains to be decided. The Act of 1945 contains no provision for a
written notice to the landlord, such as is required by the Act of June 2, 1933,
P. L. 1417 sec. 1, 12 PS sec. 2178, relating to goods held by a tenant under a bail-
1913 Standard Penna. Practice, pages 572 to 713.
2013 Standard Penna. Practice, Chapter 68, sec. 30, page 601.
21Reinhart v. Gearhardt, 152 Super. Ct. 229, (1943).
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ment or conditional sale. The Act of 1933 should b'e amended to include mort-
gaged goods, if it is deemed desirable to subordinate the landlord's claims to
those of a mortgagee.
If the mortgage covers after-acquired property, the rights of an unpaid
seller may conflict with those of the mortgagee. It is generally held that a seller
who retains a lien on the property sold, as by a recorded conditional sale con-
tract, as security for the balance of purchase money, is protected against such a
mortgage. The mortgagee must take his lien subject to such as exist when the
property is acquired, though they are liens of later date than the date of the
mortgage.
22
When goods are delivered under a conditional sale, both the seller and the
buyer have interests in the goods which can be mortgaged. 23 It should be noted,
however, that the conditional buyer may not mortgage his interest unless notice
is given in writing to the seller of the name and address of the mortgagee not
less than ten days before the mortgage is given, otherwise the seller may retake




Estrich on Instalment Sales, sec. 409, p. 812.
23
Bogert's Commentaries on' Conditional Sales, U.L.A. Vol. 2A, secs. 25 and 42.2
4Act of May 12, 1925, P.L. 603, 69 P.S. sec. 431.
